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Abstract
To understand how actors make collective policy decisions, scholars use policy and discourse network approaches to ana-
lyze interdependencies among actors. While policy networks often build on survey data, discourse networks typically use
media data to capture the beliefs or policy preferences shared by actors. One of the reasons for the variety of data sources
is that discourse data can be more accessible to researchers than survey data (or vice versa). In order to make an informed
decision on valid data sources, researchers need to understand how differences in data sources may affect results. As this
remains largely unexplored, we analyze the differences and similarities between policy and discourse networks. We sys-
tematically compare policy networks with discourse networks in respect of the types of actors participating in them, the
policy proposals actors advocate and their coalition structures. For the policy field of micropollutants in surface waters
in Germany, we observe only small differences between the results obtained using the policy and discourse network ap-
proaches. We find that the discourse network approach particularly emphasizes certain actor types, i.e., expanders who
seek to change the policy status quo. The policy network approach particularly reflects electoral interests, since prefer-
ences for policies targeting voters are less visible. Finally, different observation periods reveal some smaller differences in
the coalition structures within the discourse network. Beyond these small differences, both approaches come to largely
congruent results with regards to actor types, policy preferences and coalition structures. In our case, the use of discourse
and policy network approaches lead to similar conclusions regarding the study of policy processes.
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agenda-setting; discourse network analysis; micropollutants; policy change; policy network analysis; risk governance;
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1. Introduction
The network lens is an analytical approach to policymak-
ing, which emphasizes that policies are adopted in a bar-
gaining process between multiple actors. These actors
participate in advocating and formulating policies and in-
clude political parties, interest groups or administrative
units. As no single actor has sufficient decision-making
power, scholars adopt the network lens to uncover the
complex interdependencies among actors in policymak-
ing processes. Scholars of policy process have employed
the network approach as an analytical tool either: a) to
describe the variety of actors, their policy positions and
their relationships to one another; or b) to determine an-
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alytically how actors’ interactions shape the outcomes of
policymaking processes (Howlett, 2002).
As popularity for the network lens has increased, so
too have the number of different network approaches
(Adam & Kriesi, 2007; Börzel, 1998). One important
strand of the literature draws attention to ‘policy net-
works.’ Policy networks are defined as entities composed
of organizations involved in the formulation or imple-
mentation of public policies (Fischer, 2017). The con-
cept has its roots in the literature on the organizational
state (Laumann & Knoke, 1987) and collective action
(Laumann, Pappi, & Rossi, 1976). According to this liter-
ature a multitude of actors participates in policymaking.
The actors depend on each other to make collective de-
cisions. These interdependencies are conceptualized in
networks by nodes and ties. Examples of nodes in policy
networks are interest groups, political parties, adminis-
trative units, experts, and other actors involved in pol-
icy processes. These can be linked by ties of coopera-
tion, information exchange or conflict. In this article, we
adopt a narrow definition of policy networks by focus-
ing on actors solely involved in policy formulation, i.e.,
the production of policy outputs. The policy network ap-
proach serves to systematically test theoretical mecha-
nisms guiding the production of policy outputs.
Another body of literature focuses on ‘discourse net-
works’ (Leifeld, 2017). While the literature on discourses
is broad, its various strands converge on the claim
that discourses matter in politics. Verbal interventions
constitute important elements of political mobilization,
conflict and decision-making (Leifeld & Haunss, 2012).
Classic works on critical discourse analysis (Foucault,
1991) and deliberative democracy (Habermas, 1981)
paved the way for more empirical analytical approaches,
such as the discourse network approach. Discourse net-
works are defined as verbal interactions between politi-
cal actors which make public statements conditional on
each other about a given policy (Janning, Leifeld,Malang,
& Schneider, 2009; Leifeld, 2016, 2017). Accordingly, ac-
tors constitute the nodes in discourse networks, while
shared policy preferences expressed via public state-
ments represent the ties. The discourse network ap-
proach is an analytical tool used to systematically test the
theoretical mechanisms guiding the development of pol-
icy debates.
Both discourse and policy network approaches have
been used to elucidate the policymaking process, but
it remains unclear whether both approaches yield simi-
lar results regarding policy change. For example, Leifeld
(2013) and Bulkeley (2000) analyze policy change by
studying the formation of coalitions based on the dis-
course network approach, while Ingold (2011) and
Fischer (2014) employ the policy network approach for
the same purpose. It remains unclear whether such stud-
ies would have come to the same results if they had used
the respective other approach. To close this research gap,
we ask: Which aspects of policy change do the different
analytical frameworks emphasize?
This article compares similarities and differences be-
tween the two types of network approaches in four steps:
First, we analyze differences in the participation of actors.
Some scholars conceptualize discourses and policy pro-
cesses as two different arenas of political participation
(Binderkrantz, Christiansen, & Pedersen, 2015; Wolfe,
Jones, & Baumgartner, 2013). Organizations may opt to
participate in the discourse if they do not have access to
formal decision-making. We therefore compare how ac-
cessible both types of networks are to different actors.
Secondly, we compare policy preferences of actors.
Studies on discourse networks have relied on the content
analysis of texts, e.g., media articles or parliamentary de-
bates, in order to gather data on actors participating in
the discourse and their policy preferences (Fisher, Leifeld,
& Iwaki, 2013; Leifeld, 2013). By contrast, numerous stud-
ies on policy networks have relied on surveys (e.g., Henry,
2011; Ingold & Fischer, 2014). Here, we compare actors’
policy preferences in discourse and policy networks in or-
der to understand whether results differ systematically.
Thirdly, we scrutinize the formation of coalitions.
Coalitions refer to subgroups of actors with shared policy
preferences (Fischer, 2017). Actors form coalitions as a
strategy to pool resources among likeminded others and
influence policymaking in line with their preferences. In
policy processes, it is typical for several competing coali-
tions to exist, such as a pro-change and a pro-status quo
coalition. Here, we analyze whether discourse and pol-
icy networks fall into the same coalition structures. With
structures, we mean the overall existence, number and
strength of competing coalitions rather than the com-
position of coalitions. Consequently, the same coalition
structures (e.g., two opposing coalitions) can be in place,
even if coalitions themselves are not composed of the
same actors.
Fourthly, we investigate the degree to which differ-
ent observation periods influence results. The policy cy-
cle model conceptualizes policymaking as a series of con-
secutive stages (Easton, 1965). Networks that reflect the
agenda-setting phase of the policy process may look dif-
ferent to those that capture the decision-making phase.
Time-stamped data are available for discourse networks,
which rely on coded media data, but are difficult to
gather for policy networks, which rely on survey data.
We compare differences between discourse networks
analyzed over time and policy networks for one point
in time.
We rely on a case from German water protection
policy. An emerging issue in water protection concerns
micropollutants, i.e., chemical substances that end up
in water bodies in small concentrations but neverthe-
less raise concern due to their potential adverse health
effects on humans and the environment (Metz, 2017).
Actors involved in policy discourse and policy formula-
tion have debated on how to address the issue. Potential
policy solutions address consumers, agriculture or indus-
try in order to reduce the use of potential pollutants at
the source. An alternative policy approach addresses the
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problem from the ‘end-of-the-pipe’ by treating polluted
wastewater in sewage plants (Triebskorn et al., 2019).
The goal of this study is to uncover differences and
similarities between discourse and policy networks in
order to comprehend whether both types of analyses
produce similar results regarding policy change in demo-
cratic states. This article provides researchers with in-
sights into three key aspects of policy change: a) the
accessibility of policy venues (discourse/policy formu-
lation) to actors; b) policy proposals actors advocate;
and c) coalition structures. These insights should im-
prove researchers’ understanding of what they can in-
fer about policy processes from the data they have gath-
ered. Providing clarity is relevant in order to understand
whether both network approaches can be used to an-
swer similar research questions and empirically test the
same theories.
2. Expectations of Differences and Similarities
between the Network Approaches
2.1. Actor Participation
The literature on agenda-setting and policy narra-
tives suggests that we can expect differences between
discourse and policy networks (Baumgartner, Berry,
Hojnacki, Leech, & Kimball, 2009; Jones, McBeth, &
Shanahan, 2014). We argue that these differences can
be attributed to the differences in actor participation be-
tween the two networks.
The idea underlying why actors participate in policy
discourse is that they try to influence public opinion in or-
der to affect the dynamics of political competition (Tosun
& Schaub, 2017). The literature of comparative politics
has shown that public opinion influences policy decisions
(Mühlböck & Tosun, 2018; Wlezien, 2004). Based on the
work of Schattschneider (1960) and Baumgartner et al.
(2009), one can infer that not every actor in a policy field
is interested in participating in the discourse and draw-
ing attention to a policy issue. Politics is conceptualized
as a conflict in which competing actor coalitions strive
to influence policymaking (Weible, Sabatier, &McQueen,
2009). Depending on whether these actor coalitions aim
for policy change or to preserve the status quo, they
tend to use different strategies and use different venues
(Baumgartner et al., 2009; Jones et al., 2014). Actors can
be categorized as ‘containers’ and ‘expanders’ (Cobb &
Coughlin, 1998; Jones et al., 2014). ‘Containers’ are ac-
tors with an interest in preserving the policy status quo.
They typically aim to minimize the level of public atten-
tion on an issue and, therefore, avoid participation in a
public discourse. Regarding environmental policy, indus-
trial associations are less likely to participate in the dis-
course because they try to avoid public attention that
could result in stricter regulation. Instead, these actors
prefer to establish direct links to decision makers and ex-
ert influence in policy networks through participation in
‘polycentric’ institutional arrangements (Fischer, Angst,
&Maag, 2017; Leifeld & Schneider, 2012). This especially
holds true in corporatist political systems (Christiansen,
Mach, & Varone, 2018). On the contrary, ‘expanders’ are
actors with an interest in changing the policy status quo,
though they often have limited access to decision mak-
ers and policy networks or find themselves in a weak bar-
gaining position. In their need to adapt and use different
strategies, these actors resort to public discourse. In envi-
ronmental policy, these actors are usually environmental
or consumer protection organizations with an interest in
stricter regulation (Tosun & Schaub, 2017). For such new
or marginalized actors, public discourse is a venue com-
paratively easy to access. Their goal is to steer public opin-
ion by dominating the discourse and attracting media
attention, since this exerts pressure on decision makers
(Baumgartner et al., 2009; Jones et al., 2014;McCombs&
Shaw, 1972). Based on these considerations, we assume
that both network approaches reveal some differences
with regard to the actors participating in policymaking:
Expectation 1a: The policy network approach should
emphasize the participation of containers in the poli-
cymaking process;
Expectation 1b: The discourse network approach
should emphasize the participation of expanders in
the policymaking process.
In addition, we expect both approaches to reveal
similarities concerning the participation of political-
administrative actors, which are usually central to both
policy and discourse networks. Policy networks repre-
sent the venue in which these actors typically play
an important coordination role. Additionally, political-
administrative actors tend to participate in public dis-
course, often in an effort to sensitize the population.
Therefore, we categorize these actors as a third group
and expect both approaches to reveal their presence:
Expectation 1c: Discourse and policy network ap-
proaches should equally emphasize the participation
of political-administrative actors in the policymaking
process.
To summarize, we expect any study employing either
the discourse or the policy network approach to re-
veal differences in the types of actors participating in
policymaking. Participation depends on whether actors
want to preserve or change the policy status quo. Only
political-administrative actors are expected to bepresent
in equal degrees.
2.2. Actors’ Policy Preferences
Discourses in democratic countries ideally resemble de-
liberative arenas, while policy processes have to follow
stricter institutional rules. In the ideal model of a deliber-
ative democracy (Habermas, 1996), actors can freely par-
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ticipate in discourses. In a policy debate, state and non-
state actors can participate and express their preferences
based on their causal beliefs. The discourse network ap-
proach should, therefore, represent a broad spectrum of
actors and policy proposals.
By contrast, policy processes are governed by formal
and informal rules of participation that restrict access to
decision-making and, thereby, the spectrumof discussed
policy proposals. Formal rules attribute decision-making
power and responsibility for the design and content of
policies to elected state actors (Moe, 1990; Trebilcock &
Hartle, 1982). Informal rules provide a few non-state ac-
tors, which have a stake in or knowledge on a particu-
lar policy issue, with access to policy processes. In the
formal policymaking process, actors are less likely to pro-
pose unpopular policies that target their respective con-
stituency, because it can be costly for target groups to
implement such a policy (Metz & Ingold, 2017). Since
elected state actors are dependent on votes, they are
unlikely to express policy preferences that target their
electorate and would impose costs on their voters. In
fact, German citizens disapprove of policymeasures such
as taxes or fees that would entail personal costs (Tosun,
Schaub, & Fleig, 2020). Likewise, non-state actors are
likely to block policies that would impose the burden of
implementation on the economic or civil society groups
whose interests they represent. We expect the network
approach to reflect the vested interests of those actors
which have access to policy formulation. Policy propos-
als that do not meet the interests of respective electoral,
corporate or civil society interests are likely to be ne-
glected or rejected.
Expectation 2: The policy network approach should
more strongly reveal policy preferences that reflect re-
spective electoral, corporate or civil society interests
than the discourse network approach.
2.3. Coalitions
The concept of ‘coalitions’ is central to theories of pol-
icy process, e.g., the ‘Advocacy Coalition Framework’
(Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999), and argumentative dis-
course analysis (Hajer, 1993). Actors express their policy
preferences in discourses and during policy formulation,
and they form coalitions based on shared preferences
(Leifeld, 2013; Sabatier, 1987). Opposing coalitions com-
pete for influence on policy outputs. The coalition that
dominates the discourse or policy formulation respec-
tively has the greatest potential to shape policy outputs.
We distinguish between three ideal types of coali-
tion structures in Figure 1 (Ingold & Gschwend, 2014):
Adversarial structures with opposing coalitions and little
coordination; collaborative structures with opposing but
coordinated coalitions; and unitary structures consisting
of one dominant coalition.
Similar coalition structures should, in principle, be
observable across discourse and policy networks. In
Ideal network structures
Adversarial
Unitary
Collaborave
Figure 1. Three coalition structures. Source:Metz (2017).
Expectations 1a and 1b, we explained that discourse and
policy network approaches are likely to reveal different
actor types in policymaking. Despite such differences in
participation, it is possible that both network approaches
lead to the identification of similar coalition structures
(adversarial, collaborative or dominant coalitions), be-
cause they each reveal the same underlying lines of con-
flict that shape the formation of coalitions. For example,
both approaches could reveal a dominant pro-change
coalition if the majority of actors in the policy discourse
and in policy formulation expresses a clear preference
for policy change. In both analyses, a majority of actors
would cluster around pro-change preferences. We there-
fore expect the following similarities:
Expectation 3: Discourse and policy network ap-
proaches should reveal similar coalition structures.
2.4. Differences in Time
In his analysis of a discourse network, Leifeld (2013) ob-
serves the evolution of the policy process from one uni-
tary coalition towards a bipolarized discourse, and then
back to a new, dominant, advocacy coalition. These ob-
servations suggest that the discourse network approach
highlights the evolution of political conflict between
coalitions over time.
Observing the evolution of policy processes over
time is possible with time-stamped discourse data
(Leifeld, 2017), but rarely feasible with policy network
data. To date, the most widely applied method for gath-
ering data on policy networks is through surveys. One
would need to survey actors repeatedly in order to cap-
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ture the evolution of the policy process over time, but
such repeated surveys are rarely possible due to resource
constraints and the objections of respondents to re-
peated participation (exceptions include Ingold& Fischer,
2014). To overcome this difficulty, survey data tend to
capture the aggregate of actors’ policy preferences and
interactions during the entire policy process or during
the phases that precede the survey. Due to cognitive con-
straints and recall difficulties, it is plausible that data on
policy networks capture the phase of the policy process
in which the survey took place. If the survey took place
during polarization, the coalition structure of the policy
networks will capture this particular point of the policy
process. Our data-related expectation is as follows:
Expectation 4: Different results between policy and
discourse network approaches are due to different
measurement, time and data collection methods.
To summarize, we formulate four expectations regard-
ing the similarities and differences in actor participation,
policy preferences and coalition formation. Whereas the
first two expectations are derived from theory, the latter
two stem from methodological considerations.
3. Case, Data, and Methods
3.1. Case
In this study, we compare policy and discourse networks
in the newemerging policy field ofmicropollutants in sur-
face waters in Germany. These networks are built on ac-
tors’ preferences towards four different policy solutions
for mitigating micropollution. We observe actors’ prefer-
ences through a survey in order to construct the policy
network, and through the coding of newspaper articles
in order to construct the discourse network.
3.2. Data
3.2.1. Discourse Network
To analyze the discourse onmicropollutants, we selected
newspaper articles published in the nation-wide newspa-
per Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and in at least one
principal regional newspaper from each of the German
states (23 newspapers in total). Relevant articles were
identified by using a keyword search within the respec-
tive newspaper archives. Overall, we identified 1069 rel-
evant articles on micropollutants between January 2013
and March 2017. The number of articles per newspaper
ranges between 17 and 124. Most of the articles stem
from the regional newspapers, and the geographic distri-
bution is fairly even (see figures and tables provided in
Appendix A in the Supplementary File for details). Due
to duplicate articles that reproduced information pro-
vided by the German news agency dpa (Deutsche Presse-
Agentur), we reduced our final sample to 770 articles.
Within these articles, we coded statements that actors
made on micropollutants in surface waters. More specif-
ically, we codedwhether actors agreed or disagreedwith
the same four policy solutions thatwere also put forward
in the discourse: a) addressing consumers; b) takingmea-
sures in the agricultural sector; c) adapting industrial pro-
duction; and d) improving filtering in sewage treatment
plants (end-of-pipe). Statements were coded using the
software Discourse Network Analyzer (Leifeld, Gruber, &
Bossner, 2019). One of the authors and two research as-
sistants coded the statements to ensure reliability. After
coding, 63 of originally 173 actors were selected as rel-
evant. Relevant actors are defined as organizations that
are politically active across Germany or which issued at
least two statements at different points in time during
the observation period (see also Leifeld, 2017, on apply-
ing thresholds for participation in discourse). Selected ac-
tors issued 303 statements in total.
3.2.2. Policy Network
In 2014, we surveyed all the state and non-state ac-
tors which had participated in the legal revision of the
German Surface Water Ordinance since 2008 (see Metz,
2017, for a description of the policy process and the actor
identification method). With a response rate of 68.4%,
we obtained policy preference data for 27 actors. In the
survey, we asked respondents to indicate their level of
agreementwith the following statements on a four-point
Likert scale: a) Reducing pharmaceutical micropollution
is a consumer responsibility; b) micropollution is a re-
sponsibility of agricultural policy, c) micropollution is a
responsibility of chemical policy (in order to adapt in-
dustrial production); d) measures should be end-of-pipe.
Usually, the policy network approach links actors by ties
of cooperation or information exchange. In this study,
the policy network is built on shared policy preferences
to enhance comparability with the discourse network ap-
proach. The data were not originally collected for this
comparative study; however, the comparison is possible
as both the survey questions and the statements coded
in the discourse measure the same concepts, i.e., actors’
preferences regarding the same four policy solutions.
3.3. Methods
We apply network methodology as well as descriptive
statistics to test the plausibility of our theoretical and
data-related expectations. Given its’ small-N research de-
sign, our study constitutes a plausibility probe, i.e., a
pre-test for future theory development (Levy, 2008). In
order to probe Expectations 1 and 2, we compare ac-
tor types and their policy preferences across policy and
in discourse networks. We classify all actors represent-
ing the chemical and pharmaceutical industry as well
as the agricultural sector as containers since we expect
these to have an interest in preserving the policy status
quo. Conversely, environmental and consumer protec-
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 184–199 188
tion organizations, green political parties and actors from
the wastewater treatment sector were categorized as ex-
panders since these can be expected to have an interest
in changing the policy status quo. Political-administrative
actors include different governmental institutions and
agencies. Third-party actors include all organizations for
which no clear preference towards changing or preserv-
ing the policy status quo can be expected (see Tables B1
and B2 in the Supplementary File for an overview of the
actors and their membership).
For Expectations 3 and 4, we compare the structure
of both networks. First, we compare the policy and the
discourse networks based on the full observation period
(Expectation 3). In a further step, we divide the discourse
network into two observation periods ranging from 2013
to 2014 and 2015 to 2017 and then compare both dis-
course networks with the policy network captured in the
period before 2014 (Expectation 4). Precisely, we com-
pare one-mode networks in which actors are linked de-
pending on whether they share preferences with regard
to the four policy solutions.We compute these separately
for the policy network anddiscourse network data. The re-
sulting matrices contain actors in rows and columns, with
cell values indicating the degree of shared policy prefer-
ences. High values indicate high similarity and low values
low similarity. More specifically, we analyze ‘subtract’ net-
works; these are created by combining ‘congruence’ and
‘conflict’ networks, which means that they include both
agreement and disagreement on policy solutions. In con-
gruence networks, actors are linked if they co-support or
co-reject a policy proposal. In conflict networks, actors
are linked if one actor supports while the other opposes
a policy. The subtract network then combines both ap-
proaches by subtracting conflict network ties from con-
gruence network ties (Leifeld, 2017). To improve the com-
parability of discourse and policy networks, we normal-
ized both networks via the ‘jaccard similarity measure’
(see Leifeld, 2017, and Leifeld et al., 2019, for discourse
network normalization). We graph the networks by plac-
ing actors as nodes in a two-dimensional space based on
their connectedness. Nodes are linked by edges if they
share policy preferences. Negative edges indicating con-
flicting policy preferences had been removed beforehand
(see Nagel, 2016, for a similar application). This approach
allows researchers to evaluate the structure of networks
and to identify actor clusters, since actors with higher de-
grees of similarity are placed closer to each other (Leifeld
et al., 2019). Finally, we compare differences in subgroup
structures within the networks by conducting a cluster
analysis (Leifeld et al., 2019). More specifically, we ap-
ply hierarchical cluster analysis usingWard’s optimization
method in order to probe Expectation 3 (Jain & Dubes,
1988). To compare the two observation periods of dis-
course networks, we detect communities by using the ‘sp-
inglass’ algorithm (Reichardt & Bornholdt, 2006).
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Actor Participation
We expected the policy network approach to empha-
size the participation of containing actors more strongly
than the discourse network approach (Expectation 1a).
Conversely, we expected the discourse network ap-
proach to emphasize expanding actors (Expectation 1b).
Figure 2 portrays the share of containers, expanders,
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Figure 2. Emphasis of different actor types.
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political-administrative and third-party actors. The re-
sults support Expectations 1a and 1b. The policy network
reveals a larger share of containing actors (ca. 25%) com-
pared to the discourse network (ca. 10%). The discourse
network emphasizes expanding actors more strongly
(ca. 45%) than the policy network (ca. 25%). However,
Figure 2 also shows that the share of containers and ex-
panders in the policy network is about equal. This might
be a result of the efforts of political-administrative ac-
tors to include every relevant stakeholder in the policy
formulation process. Thus, differences in emphasis can
mostly be traced back to the discourse network, which
aligns well with our theoretical argument.
Both networks reveal the presence of political-
administrative actors, which is in linewith our theoretical
expectation. However, they are more pronounced in the
policy network. The discourse network is characterized
by a larger share of third-party actors. This is mainly due
to the larger number of scientific institutions present in
the discourse.
Figure 3 gives further details on actors’ affiliations
and their relative frequency within both networks. The
policy network is characterized by a larger share of or-
ganizations that are affiliated with the agricultural and
industrial sectors, which mostly explains the differences
in containers between both approaches. The share of
political-administrative actors from federal, state and
regional levels is also larger, which can be explained
by their coordination role in the policy network. The
discourse network emphasizes political parties more
strongly, mainly the German Green Party (Alliance 90/
The Greens). Political parties are not represented in the
policy network, because the legal proposal was exclu-
sively discussed in the parliamentary chamber that rep-
resents the German states (German Bundesrat). Rather
surprisingly, the share of environmental organizations is
equal. However, this observation fits the presumption
that political-administrative actors strived to include ev-
ery relevant stakeholder in the legal revision.
To summarize, the policy and the discourse networks
differ in their emphasis on containing and expanding ac-
tors. These differences aremostly due to the unequal dis-
tribution in the discourse network (blue bars in Figure 2).
As expected, political-administrative actors are present
in both networks.
4.2. Actors’ Policy Preferences
Discourse and policy networks are expected not only to
differ in the composition of actor types but also regarding
actors’ policy preferences. Specifically, we expect the dis-
course network to be more open to discussions on poli-
cies that are aimed at target groups, such as consumers
or voters. Figure 4 depicts the share of actors that agree
or disagree with each of the four discussed policy solu-
tions in both networks.
First, we report differences in the data underlying
policy and discourse network analysis. Whereas in policy
networks most of the surveyed actors took a position on
all four policy solutions, the discourse network is charac-
terized by a large share of ‘missing’ information.Many ac-
tors present in the discourse only positioned themselves
302520151050
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Figure 3. Presence of different actors.
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Figure 4. Agreement and disagreement on policy preferences.
on one or two of the discussed policy solutions. The dif-
ferences can be traced back to the different types of data
collection. Whereas surveys ask actors to indicate their
preferences (agreement or rejection) from a predefined
list, the discourse network approach only captures the
spectrum of preferences that actors formulate. Second,
and contrary to the policy network, the discourse net-
work reveals mostly ‘positive’ statements in which actors
indicate agreement with policy solutions.
Regarding our theoretical considerations, the pol-
icy preferences revealed by both network approaches
are surprisingly similar. Agreement with measures ad-
dressing the agricultural and industrial sector is high in
both networks (at least among those actors that made
a statement on these measures within the discourse).
Disagreement with end-of-pipe solutions is stronger in
the policy network. Here, actors are divided on the ques-
tion of whether end-of-pipe measures are best for mit-
igating the entry of micropollutants, with around 44%
agreeing and 52% disagreeing. We can mainly observe
differences between the approaches in the measures
that address consumers. Here, opposition is stronger in
policy networks; this might be due to electoral concerns
as actors wish to avoid increasing costs for voters.
To summarize, we can observe differences in the
positions taken in both networks. As predicted in
Expectation 2, policies targeting consumers, i.e., voters,
are less prominent in the policy than in the discourse
network, which may be due to electoral concerns. Apart
from this difference, similarities among the policy pro-
posals put forward in both networks are surprisingly high.
In contrast to Expectation 2, results do not particularly
emphasize the policy preferences of corporate interests
in the policy network. In the latter, only few actors reject
policies targeting agriculture or industry.
4.3. Coalitions
We expected discourse and policy networks to reveal
similar network structures regarding the formation of
coalitions. Figure 5 gives a first visual impression of
the structure and the composition of subgroups within
both networks.
Polarization in the discourse network is rather low. In
fact, most actors cluster in the middle as they share pol-
icy preferences with many other actors within the net-
work. There are only a few actors which form small op-
posing clusters that surround one big cluster in the mid-
dle. The gradual removal of links between actors with
lower weights, i.e., fewer shared policy preferences, sub-
stantiates this impression (see the network graphs in C1
in the Supplementary File). However, we can observe
that four of the six containers form a separate cluster,
indicating some divergence between containing and ex-
panding actors. Nevertheless, the network indicates a
higher degree of consent than conflict. Therefore, we
conclude that the discourse network is characterized by
a unitary or strongly collaborative structure.
The structure of the policy network is similar. The
network consists of one large group of actors in the cen-
ter of the graph. Within this center, two subgroups exist.
Within these subgroups, edgeweights are higher, indicat-
ing a slightly higher degree of preference similarity (see
also the network graphs in B2 in the Supplementary File).
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• Container
• Expander
• Polical-administrave
• Third-party
(a) (b)
Figure 5. Subtract networks. (a) Discourse network, (b) Policy network. Notes: Line widths are dependent on edge weight (the more shared policy preferences, the thicker the line
between two actors). Actors have been positioned using the Fruchterman-Reingold algorithm.
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Much like the discourse network, there aremany links be-
tween the subgroups, indicating that polarization is not
very strong. Regarding actor types, expanding and con-
taining actors do not cluster in separate groups, which
further indicates an absence of conflict. Overall, we can
conclude that the policy network also reveals a unitary
or strongly collaborative structure.
The results of the hierarchical cluster analysis sub-
stantiate the conclusions drawn from our first analysis
of the network structures. Figure 6 depicts the results
as a dendrogram in which similar actors are grouped to-
gether as clusters. The height of the branches displays
the similarity or dissimilarity of actor groups. The lower
the branches connecting two clusters, the more similar
they are. The heat map located underneath the dendro-
gram illustrates each actor’s positioning on the policy so-
lutions discussed.
The discourse network is characterized by a larger
number of smaller cliques with unique policy prefer-
ences, rather than adversarial coalitions. This impres-
sion prevails upon closer inspection of the actor groups’
shared policy preferences in the heat map. One group of
actors on the left mostly agrees on solutions that either
address consumers or apply an end-of-pipe approach. In
the middle, one group opposes an end-of-pipe approach
and another one only favors solutions targeting the in-
dustrial or the agricultural sector. There is one larger
group on the right which supports solutions addressing
consumers and the industrial sector. Finally, there are a
few smaller groups with actors which support solutions
targeting the industry but differ in their preference to-
wards other solutions.
The policy network consists of two groups of actors,
though actors in both of these groups have very simi-
lar policy preferences. Most actors support measures in
the agricultural and industrial sector and oppose policies
that address consumers. The two groups only emerge
as distinct from one another due to their divergent posi-
tions on the question of whether end-of-pipe measures
should be prioritized. While the group on the left op-
poses the prioritization of end-of-pipe measures, the
group on the right remains mostly supportive. Overall,
the results of the cluster analysis also indicate a uni-
tary structure.
To summarize, policy and discourse networks reveal
similar coalition structures. Both are characterized by a
unitary or strongly collaborative structure. Observed dif-
ferences between networks are rather small.
4.4. Differences in Time
Turning to Expectation 4, we split the discourse network
into two periods and analyze whether significant differ-
ences in network structures can be observed.
Figure 7 depicts the subtract networks for both pe-
riods and the results of community detection (node col-
ors). When looking at clusters, the network in Period 2
(January 2015–March 2017) is less polarized than in pe-
riod 1 (January 2013–December 2014). The results of
community detection also suggest differences in the net-
work structures. The analysis reveals three larger and
one very small group in the first period. In the second pe-
riod, we identify four groups. However, the positions of
these groups overlap to a large degree. The higher num-
ber of policy preferences shared bymembers of different
groups in the second period indicates that similarity be-
tween groups (between-group density) increased com-
pared to in the first period. This further points towards
an evolution of network structure over time.
The results of hierarchical cluster analyses and closer
inspection of the specific policy preferences substantiate
these observations (see the dendrograms and heatmaps
in Figures E1 and E2 in the Supplementary File) since con-
gruence between the actors increases over time. Actors
are less divided concerning measures in the agricultural
or industrial sectors in Period 2. Instead, the question of
whether end-of-pipe measures should be prioritized is
nowmore prominent in Period 2 and divides some of the
actors. In this regard, Period 2 of the discourse network
resembles the policy network more closely as divisions
on this policy solution coincide with the main line of con-
flict in the policy network.
To summarize, we can observe some small differ-
ences between both observation periods. In fact, the
structure of the discourse network in the second period
resembles the policy network more closely. Although
the differences are not very strong, it is noteworthy
that different time periods may lead to different results.
These findings suggest that data collection for policy net-
works at different points in time could most likely also in-
crease the accuracy of results. This especially holds true
when analyzing policymaking processes that stretch over
a longer period of time.
5. Conclusions
Both policy and discourse network approaches are used
to analyze policymaking processes, but there is a lack
of empirical studies comparing the similarities and dif-
ferences in results that these approaches reveal regard-
ing policy change. While policy networks often build on
survey data, discourse networks typically employ media
data to capture actors’ shared policy preferences. In or-
der to make an informed decision on valid data sources,
researchers need to understand how differences in data
sources may affect results. As this remains largely unex-
plored, we systematically compared policy and discourse
networks by taking the case of water policy in Germany.
In a first set of theoretical expectations, we explored
differences based on the idea that discourses may repre-
sent a more deliberative process, open to marginalized
actors and various policy proposals, compared to pol-
icy networks. In a second set of expectations, we inves-
tigated similarities, i.e., whether similar coalition struc-
tures of actors with shared policy preferences emerged
in both types of networks.
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Figure 6. Cluster analysis. Notes: Blue = agreement; red = disagreement; white = no statement. The colors illustrate actor’s positioning on the policy solutions equivalent to Figure 4.
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(a) (b)
Figure 7. Comparing discourse networks over time. (a) January 2013–December 2014, (b) January 2015–March 2017. Notes: Node colors refer to different community membership;
line width is dependent on edge weight (the more shared policy preferences, the thicker the line between two actors); actors have been positioned using the Fruchterman-Reingold
algorithm.
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For our case, we find that the different analytic ap-
proaches lead to largely similar results, though some dif-
ferences becomemanifest as well. First, results from pol-
icy and discourse network approaches differ in their em-
phasis on actor types. Whereas the share of actors with
an interest in expanding or containing an issue is equal
in the policy network, expanders dominate the discourse
network. Results can be interpreted as a specificity of
Germany, or corporatist states more generally, where or-
ganized interests (e.g., industry) have institutionalized ac-
cess to policy formulation. Their lack of access to pol-
icy formulation may drive expanders to be particularly
active in the policy discourse. Results could also be in-
terpreted as specificities of methodological approaches.
Studies that employ the discourse network approach
could systematically emphasize expanders more than
the policy network approach does. Future research is
needed that compares expanders’ and containers’ access
to policy venues (discourse/policy formulation) across
corporatist and pluralist countries.
Secondly, both network approaches capture a high
number of similarities among policy proposals, though
some differences become manifest, as expected, when
policies target consumers, i.e., voters. Such preferences
are less visible in the policy than in the discourse network
approach. Results may forewarn future research that
policies targeting voters, e.g., demand-sided policies, are
sensitive topics and therefore show up more promi-
nently in discourse than in policy network approaches.
Such dissimilarities also have implications for the analy-
sis of coalitions. Coalitions are identified based on the
shared preferences of actors. However, if actors strate-
gically mask (or emphasize) their preferences depend-
ing on the venue (discourse/policy formulation), schol-
ars should carefully evaluate how to integrate preference
data into coalition analysis in order to produce results
that are congruent across approaches.
Thirdly, the structures of policy and discourse net-
works are similar. Both networks are characterized by
lowpolarization and a unitary structure. Although the dif-
ferences in coalition structure are rather small, results
indicate that discourse and policy network approaches
highlight different games that actors play in discourses
and policy formulation. The low share of disagreement
statements in the discourse network suggests that ac-
tors focus on promoting their preferred policy propos-
als. In policy formulation, by contrast, actors seem ad-
ditionally concerned with blocking unpopular proposals.
The manner in which data are gathered emphasizes such
differences because surveys explicitly ask respondents
to indicate which policy proposals they support and re-
ject, while media tends to report on policies that ac-
tors support.
Lastly, the structure of the discourse network dif-
fers between observation periods. Although the differ-
ences are not very strong, it is noteworthy that different
time periods affect results. Collecting data for policy net-
works at different points in timewould increase the accu-
racy of results. As it remains challenging to survey polit-
ical actors repeatedly, future research is needed which
explores innovative data-collection methods that over-
come the constraints of survey research (e.g., low par-
ticipation) but still provide insider information about the
policymaking process.
A key insight of our study is that some, albeit small,
differences exist between policy and discourse network
analyses. The discourse network approach emphasizes
expanders, while the policy network approach masks ac-
tors’ preferences for policies targeting voters. As differ-
ences are surprisingly low, our results suggest that both
discourse and policy network data can be used to study
the policy process and that results should not differ sys-
tematically. The conclusions apply to our case, but the
generalizability is limited due to several reasons. First,
the small-N research design of this study possibly ac-
centuates idiosyncrasies, i.e., characteristics that might
be case-specific. For instance, the low level of polariza-
tion that the discourse network approach revealedmight
also stem from the fact that micropollution is a rather
technical issue that actors have not yet politicized in the
German media. Second, our discourse network analysis
includes four concepts, whereas most of the published
studies on discourse networks consider a larger number
of concepts. The use of a limited number of concepts in
our case could be one reason for the low level of polar-
ization that we find within the discourse network. With
more concepts, however, the analysis of coalition struc-
tures should be more fine-grained. In fact, most pub-
lished studies on discourse networks find strongly polar-
ized coalitions (Fisher, Waggle, & Leifeld, 2013; Leifeld,
2013; Tosun & Lang, 2016). In order to enhance exter-
nal validity, future research comparing discourse and
policy networks should use a more extensive number
of concepts and apply a large-N and comparative re-
search design.
To generate further theory-relevant insights, future
research should identify the origin of differences be-
tween analytical approaches. Are differences a conse-
quence of data-gathering techniques or an indication
that different theoretical mechanisms guide the devel-
opment of policy debates or policy formulation? To date,
only a few comparative network studies exist (exceptions
include Metz, 2017; Ylä-Anttila et al., 2018) to which we
could compare our results in order to address this ques-
tion. Ingold et al. (2020) follow a slightly different goal in
their comparison of data on policy preferences that were
gathered using surveys and coded consultations. They
report differences in data on actors’ policy preferences
across data sources, in particular for policy losers, i.e.,
actors whose positions were not considered in the final
policy decision. They can only speculate where changes
come from, e.g., as losers may want to mask their politi-
cal loss. Their study encounters the same difficulty as we
do in identifying the origin of these differences. One pos-
sible conclusion is that both survey and media data can
only approximate what happens during policy processes.
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However, future developments, e.g., e-democracy, could
increase the transparency of this and thereby draw a
sharper picture of policy change.
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